

1. An Empirical Study of the Set Expression

..., but it does not follow from this that...

The below analysis is an attempt at describing one of the forms of manifestation of the semantic-pragmatic construct named „double syllogism” (Békési 1994, 2003, 2004). Double syllogism, heretofore basically interpreted on a theoretical level and through logical parallels of linguistic constructs, emerges here in the form of a set expression. Although the empirical study concentrates on examples taken from Hungarian, the semantic-pragmatic relationship viewed from the point of view of double syllogism manifests itself in English in the form of more or less set expressions.

1.1. Sentence vs. Proposition

Text is composed of segments whose sentences and blocks sentences have the value of an utterance. The proposition with a value entails – especially in argumentative texts – (among other things) frequent association with each other through reason and cause / cause and reason relations. In one group, the speaker often leaves it to the interlocutor to identify and assess such relations, without applying connective linguistic elements to denote the relation between such utterances.

In another group of such reason and cause / cause and reason relations, the means used would be explicit. Furthermore, some of these means (those derived from adverbs) even have a referential meaning, cf. *emiat* [therefore], *(ebből) következően* [as a result (of that)], *következésképp(en)* [consequently], etc. In this latter group, special mention should be made in this context of the set expression „..., *de ebből még nem következik, hogy...*” [but it does not follow from this that...]. Here, the utterance appearing as the second part of the *but*-relation plays two different roles, at least from a logical point of view. The utterance is partly a conclusion of a syllogistic inference, and it takes modal precedence over the base of inference of the antecedent, in other words, the modality of the set of the minor premise and major premise of the antecedent.²⁹

²⁹ It should be noted here that ‘modality’, in general, involves the way in which the speaker creates the model of the interrelation between the subject and the predicate of an utterance, on the basis of a fact, a possibility, or necessity. The tools used to create the model are predominantly linguistic, i.e., lexical and morphological in nature. Alongside these tools, modality is created with the help of a pragmatic-semantic construct, namely, double syllogism, taking the form of a set expression like „..., *de ebből még nem következik, hogy...*”.

There is no need here for a detailed presentation of the syllogistic character of inferences. The set expression „..., *de ebből még nem következik, hogy...*” underlines the caution required when one intends to infer ‘factuality’ of a state of affairs from an antecedent having a ‘possibility’ modality expressed by lexemes like *lehet* [maybe] (or *előfordul* [happens], a *megesik* [occurs], az *olykor* [at times], etc.); or to infer present or future ‘necessity’ on the basis of expressions like „*tény, hogy*” [it is a fact that]; „*igaz, hogy*” [it is true that]; „*érthető, hogy*” [it is understandable that] etc., suggesting factuality.

The examples below are used simply to illustrate the major steps of the argumentation presented here.

1.2. Modal Cases of Double Syllogism

1.2.1. The posterior constituent of the *but*-relation is a negative sentence

1.2.1.1. The speaker uses the set expression to warn the interlocutor not to infer factuality from possibility/partiality.

- (1) „*Megesik a legjobb családban is, hogy zabigyerék születik, de ebből még nem következik, hogy minden családban csak zabigyerék születik.*” (Könczöl Csaba: Múlt és Jövő, 1989. 82)

[It happens that a chance child is born even in the best family, but it does not follow from this that only chance children are born in all families.]

- (2) „*A szellemi fejlődést bizonyos korokban haladásnak tekintették, de ebből még nem következik, hogy ez a két gondolat mindenben azonos volna.*” (Thienemann Tivadar: Irodalomtörténeti alapfogalmak, 1930. 23)

[In some periods, intellectual development was seen as making progress, but it does not follow from this that these two thoughts are completely identical.]

- (3) „*Elhalad az ember előtt egy áltekinély: talán még megilletődöttséget is kivált, s jókora idő is eltelik sokszor, mire felébred az ember, s kiköp. Esetleg éppen akkor teszi ezt, amikor a valódi érkezik meg elé. Mert az élet egy nagy-nagy karnevál, az egyik kocsin ugyan papírmáséból van a tüzet okádó brontosaurusz, de ebből még nem következik, hogy a következőn esetleg nem valódi az őshüllő.*” (Csurka István: Kettes kolbász, 1980. 199)

[... Because life is a greatest carnival, while the brontosaurus spouting fire on one of the carts is made from pasteboard, but it does not follow from this that, possibly, the ancient reptile on the next one will also be unreal.]

1.2.1.2 Something real viewed as being true/acceptable should not be interpreted as a necessity.

- (4) „*De Man, érezve, hogy a szocialistaelmélet kényes pontjához nyúl, nem sajnálja a pedagógus-fáradtságot. Igazat ad a marxizmusnak abban, hogy az eszméknek anyagi előfeltételük van. De ebből még nem következik, hogy maguk nem valóságok, csak tükröződései az egyedül valóságos anyagi viszonyoknak. Egy dolog attól még nem valótlán, hogy oka van. Valótlán akkor volna csak, ha ő maga nem lehetne más jelenségek okává.*” (Németh László: A minőség forradalma 5–6., 1943. 131)

[De Man ... admits that Marxism is right in presuming that ideas depend on material premises. But it does not follow from this that they themselves are not realistic and represent mere reflections of solely realistic material relations. Something is not unreal just because it has a reason for its existence. ...]

- (5) „*Aztán itt vannak a szorongásosok, tériszonyosok, hipochonderek, kényszeresek, neuraszténias hisztériások... Néha csak egyetlen furcsa alaptünettel, amire ráépül a bonyolult kórkép, a közös alaptünet az életképtelenség. Gyenge a létért folytatott küzdelemhez, ez a lényeg. Hogy ez is gyakran összefonódik szexuális zavarral, az érthető, de ebből még nem mernék arra következtetni, hogy a szexuális*

zavar okozza az életképtelenséget.” (Benedek István: Aranyketrec. Egy elmeosztály élete, 1957. 371)

[... Struggle for life is weak, that is the point. *It is understandable that this, too, is often combined with sexual disorder, but I would not dare to infer from this that sexual disorder causes inviability.*]

1.3. The posterior constituent of the but-relation is an affirmative sentence

The argumentation used before is reinforced by reversal of the direction of inference. Here, the contrastive posterior constituent represents an affirmative, rather than a negative utterance: „*A fenti elemzésből [nem kéne következnie], mégis az következik, hogy...*” [*The above analysis [would not entail, it] nevertheless entails that ...*]

- (6) „*A morális jogok fogalma nincs hozzákötve a természetjoghoz, hiszen a [fent] mondottak nem feltételezik, hogy az igazolt morális jogok a társadalomban élő emberek szabályalkotó, szabályalkalmazó és szabályfenntartó tevékenységén s a szabályokról folytatott társadalmi vitán kívül léteznének. (...) A fenti elemzésből mégis az következik, hogy az igazolt morális jogok rendelkeznek a természetes jogok egy sor fontos tulajdonságával, ami lehetővé teszi, hogy a kodifikált jogok, a kodifikált törvény mércéjeként használjuk őket.*” (Kis János: Beszélő, 1986. 395)

[*The notion of moral rights is not bound to the law of kind ... Nevertheless it follows from the above analysis that justified moral rights are bound to the law of kind...*]

Readers of the above argumentation are put in the picture through the *mégis az következik, hogy* [nevertheless it follows] segment, however, the implicit constituents of the relation are made more transparent by applying the structure of double syllogism.

1.3.1. If the posterior constituent of the argumentation (*A fenti elemzésből mégis az következik, hogy...* [*Nevertheless it follows from the above analysis that*]) is the conclusion of its own inference (contained in the posterior constituent), then the contrastive *mégis* [nevertheless] „triggers” an immediate contrastive relation with the conclusion of the first inference. (Legend. (Aq*) = implicit conclusion of the antecedent, (Bq) = explicit conclusion of the posterior constituent.)

(Aq*) nem kéne tehát annak következnie, hogy..., *mégis* (Bq) *az következik, hogy...*
[(Aq*) would, thus, not entail that ..., nevertheless (Bq) it follows that...]

1.3.2. Implicit presence of the conclusion represented by the (Aq*) symbol is confirmed, in addition to the conjunction *mégis* [nevertheless], also related to it by the contrastive (Bq), but the explicit minor premise of the first inference, i.e., (Ap), and the major premise (typically implicit) that is concomitant with the minor premise, i.e., (Apr*) as well.

(Ap) *A morális jogok fogalma nincs hozzákötve a természetjoghoz,...*
[(Ap) *The notion of moral rights is not bound to the law of kind ...*]

The predominant constituent of the initial structure applied here is the "deep structure" conjunction as interpreted by JÁNOS S. PETŐFI and denoted by ET (Petőfi 1991). In this case, ET validates the statement which is axiomatic in logic and according to which no minor premise is possible without a major one; as regards semantics and pragmatics, it validates the statement according to which generation of a description of a state of affairs depends upon the presence of general/collective experience, knowledge, etc. related to it. The issue of whether facts can be viewed as 'reality' is one of the most important issues in arts philosophy.

(Apr*) If two notions are not „bound to each other”, then one cannot expect availability of one notion to lead to the availability of the other notion.

1.4. Linear architecture of double syllogistic inferences

In the case at hand, the *de [but]* conjunction representing the major contrastive relation, followed by the set expression *ebből nem következik* [*it does not follow that*] and their order also specify the order of the remaining constituents. The implicit conclusion (Aq*) of the antecedent appears on the same level as the explicit conclusion (Bq) of the posterior constituent, immediately preceding the *de [but]* conjunction. The statement begins with the explicit minor premise representing the basis of the inference, and the implicit major premise is attached to it by way of deep structure ET conjunction.

The explicit conclusion of the posterior constituent may have, as a reason for its existence, its own basis of the inference, as illustrated in (4). (*De ebből még nem következik, hogy maguk nem valóságok, csak tükröződései az egyedül valóságos anyagi viszonyoknak. Egy dolog [ugyanis] attól még nem valótlan, hogy oka van. [But it does not follow from this that they themselves are not realistic and represent mere reflections of solely realistic material relations. Something is [after all] not unreal just because it has a reason for its existence. ...]*). The role of conclusion is, however, determined by its own fixed place and also certainty, a higher level of modality expressed in it.

1.5. Denial of expectation and contrast as differences in scope

The use of the set expression analysed here has been illustrated through examples in which the posterior constituent of the contrastive relation is modelled with the conjunction *de [but]*. The choice is evident: the conjunction *de [but]* is used for denial of expectation, that is, denial of some expectation that has the role of a conclusion (Lakoff 1971). This, however, does not preclude the use of the contrastive *azonban [however]* for denying some expectation.

Speakers of the above examples could have conveyed the contrastive role of the adversative relation by using the conjunction *however* positioned after the DP contrasted, similarly, for example, to (4):


(4) (Ebből viszont még nem következik, hogy...)

It is interesting to note that the contrastive relation in an English example quoted in 1973 models the contrastive relation also by the conjunction denying expectation, cf.:

(6) Mary is beautiful *but* dumb, *but* Helen is perfect. (Stockwell–Schachter–Partee 1973. 396). In Hungarian, the second opposition is contrastive, rather than one denying expectation, thereby breaking down sentential meaning more adequately:

Mária szép, *de* buta, Ilona **viszont** tökéletes. / *Mary is beautiful but dumb, Helen, on the other hand, is perfect.*

The meanings of the sentences may be broken down in a straightforward manner by applying a tree structure representation.



The train of thought dealing with the syllogistic role of the two predicates (*beautiful, dumb*) would take this issue as a starting point. I have presented a number of analyses on this topic, therefore, in conclusion, I will point out the basic consideration relevant for the issue at hand. Both predicates function here as minor premises. Their contrast is modelled by the conjunction *but* only indirectly. The contrastive relation directly holds between the implicit, linguistically latent affirmative and negative conclusions.

1.6. The set expression presented above in the analyses of the examples offers a way to explain a number of further observations, a part of which will be pointed out in Volume 19 of *Szemiotikai szövegtan / Semiotic Textology*. The general lesson we learn from them is that syllogistic relations must not be ignored, especially in the course of analysis of texts having an argumentative character.

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